Being in Heidegger's Shoes by Losev, Alexandre
NotaBene
NotaBene е електронно списание за философски и
политически науки. Повече за нас
Being in Heidegger's Shoes
Брой





Being in Heidegger's Shoes
 
                                                           Alexandre Losev
 
Including Heidegger's work among the among the most notable intellectual
developments of the 20th century seems to be largely justified, even if some of its
aspects are of doubtful value. During the years 1935-6 Heidegger gave a series of talks
about art and later their content became available as the text of Der Ursprung des
Kunstwerkes (known in translation as The origin of work of art [1]). In 1968 art historian
Meyer Schapiro [2]spotted what appears to be a factual error in it and publicly
questioned Heidegger's work. This could have been a minor academic quibble if it had
not been wittily commented by Jacques Derrida in 1978. The French revue Macula
published his article, Restitutions - de la vérité en pointure, and the same year it was
incorporated in a book bearing the title De la vérité en peinture [3]. The case gained
notoriety as it was part of the more general debate about Heidegger's political
engagements but Derrida's exceptional popularity has given to it an extra dimension:
recently a spectacle De la vérité en pointure was created on the stage and an
exhibition took Pointure as title [4]. These far fetched developments witness the
sustained attention this case attracts. During the last three decades it has been
discussed by most anybody concerned with Heidegger's aesthetic philosophy and/or
political views [5]. There is little interest in retelling once more all the details and the
gist of the story is readily grasped from two brief texts among  Schapiro's writings.
However there seems to be an aspect which appears to have been disregarded and
perhaps worth investigating.
 
By taking a quote from Heidegger's text and to turning it against its author Schapiro
realized a deft rhetorical move. After some pathetic writing about the peasant, whose
shoes Heidegger saw in a picture by van Gogh, a defiant remark is found: "It would be
the worst self-deception to believe that our description had first imagined ['ausgemalt']
everything thus as a subjective act and then projected it onto the painting". Schapiro
pointedly commented: "Alas for him, the philosopher has deceived himself. He has
retained from his encounter with van Gogh's canvas a moving set of associations with
peasants and the soil, which are not sustained by the picture itself. They are grounded
rather in his own social outlook with its heavy pathos of the primordial and earthy. He
has indeed "imagined everything and projected it into the painting"". For Freudian
minded exegetes Heidegger's text contained a 'denegation', an explicit denying, which
according to them would not have occurred to someone convinced in his own thesis.
Obviously Heidegger knew how weak his reading is [6]and by drawing attention to it he
attempted to make it look stronger - a bluff to discourage criticism. Schapiro's actually
took the challenge and offered evidence which showed Heidegger's musings to be not
just fanciful but factually inadequate.
As Thomson recently noted [7], philosophers tend to minimize the mistake while other
critics are prone to emphasize it. Of course, it is not difficult to see why it is thus.
Except as refutations, particular facts are rarely important for philosophical texts. In
dealing with a artworks or history, however, particulars are rather important. Most
generally one might disagree with Heidegger's stance toward rural life: while he
cherishes it, someone else could hate it if (s)he has had some hard experience of it. A
pair of peasant shoes for she or him would be associated with mud, smell, dirt, aching
muscles and other such unpleasant things. This is obviously a serious flaw in
Heidegger's discoursing and it is rather distinct from the object that functions in his text,
namely: a famous painting by van Gogh, showing a pair of peasant shoes. Changing
different elements in this two-tiered description could reveal what matters for the
discussion. "Famous" is just aimed at the audience which does not see the picture and,
further, 'painting' might have been a 'drawing', just as 'van Gogh' might have been 'X',
all of this leaving the situation essentially unchanged. Nevertheless dragging in van
Gogh's name might be objectable for those who appreciate his work but not
Heidegger's writing. Schapiro actually raises separately the issue about van Gogh's
'presence'. But the viewpoints are clearly mismatched: for Heidegger it is a question of
content while for Schapiro it is mostly some painting by van Gogh and nobody else. At
this level of the description apparently nothing really matters, so the controversy is
seen to be on the content shown: a pair of peasant shoes. Derrida has commented the
fact that the shoes are taken to be a pair and he is superficially right as painting one or
three shoes would have been odd. Replacing the pair of peasant shoes by some other
peasant object, e.g. a bucket or a hoe, seems also possible with minimal violence to
the text and to its meaning. So the point of all this scrutinizing turns out to be their
presumed appartenance to a peasant. It just this point that has been shown to be false
but not much depends really on it: extolling the farmers' work and contesting the use of
van Gogh's painting are independent from it. An additional twist has been added as the
owner of the shoes represented has been found to be not just some city dweller but
van Gogh himself.
Der Ursprung offers a fairly complete view of Heidegger's aesthetic theory and this is,
of course, what makes the quarrel rather important. Even if Heidegger generally
objects to  'aesthetics' and insists to deriving his insights phenomenologically there are
three salient points in it to be noted here: (1) Great art needs no name. This might
sound rather archaic and, in postmodern times, even absurd: much of today's art is
made just by the artist's name - one might start by remembering Duchamp's ready
mades and his Fountain. (2) There is a perennial essence of art - but Heidegger had to
admit that the Greeks did not know it and their 'techne' was craftsman ability. (3) Art
has some cognitive content, it is connected to 'aletheia', with the revelation of truth;
allowing to see things differently, it suggests variation grounded in permanence. This
conclusion and the steps to it are personal convictions of Heidegger but they are
swamped in a distasteful rhetoric built on nazi ideology. It is still easy to perceive that
his referrings to 'Earth'/'soil', 'peasants', 'people', 'decisiveness', 'history', etc., etc. are
value laden terms and keywords of official nazi discourse. The years 1935-6, when
Heidegger delivered his talks, were indeed troubled time for artists: German officials
carried a large scale attack on what they termed Degenerate Art/Entartrete Kunst. The
campaign culminated in an exhibition were examples of 'such' art were presented. A
parallel counter-exhibition of genuine and healthy German Art was also set up. Its
curators did not have a clear conception but their judgment was derived from official
discourse and its diffuse ideology.
The first two points noted above appear however to be at odds with this. If art has a
perennial essence, promoting a Deutsche Kunst, or any particular historic development
should not matter essentially; modern art should be as legitimate as the older. What is
more, with their naturalistic approach, nazi ideologues firmly connected artists their
work and indeed this allowed them to ban any production by Jews, racially inferior
people and/or madmen - it is to them that 'degenerate' applies first of all. Heidegger
however insisted that the artist disappeared in a work that was self standing - his
personality or name did not matter. But connecting art with the revelation of truth,
agrees with the official view: art is neither formal nor an amusement - it is edifying, not
to say 'propaganda'. So, Heidegger is found to agree with nazism in principle but
disagrees on details. In the same way as rector he had agreed with the political line but
refused to allow a book burning in his university.
 
Today, just as in the mid sixties when Schapiro wrote his article, it is easy to perceive
how conservative, outdated and unsound is the aesthetic theory from Der Urspung [8]
Heidegger's view of the Shoes seems equally unconvincing and most readers would
rather agree with Schapiro who prefers to see a tramp standing in them. But when
Schapiro challenged Der Ursprung he perceived just as clearly its political undertones.
To put it bluntly, he accused Heidegger of appropriating van Gogh's work for the nazi
ideology. If one insists that Heidegger had his own brand of nazism the accusation
loses some of its sting. It might be argued that actually Heidegger could have been
trying to save van Gogh's work from official condemnation. By ascertaining that the
picture of the shoes embodies the values exalted by nazism he shielded it from the
qualification 'degenerate art'. His rhetoric is distasteful heavy handed: one might
suspect that a rather grotesque analogy is suggested between an ancient  temple
rising above the landscape and the shoes appearing out of nowhere in the canvass.
But Heidegger was arguing against zealots and morons and the quip "It would be the
worst self-deception to believe that our description had first imagined everything" would
be intimidation tactic. Considering his own theory it appears rather superfluous to
suppose that he was trying to convince not just his listeners but himself. The picture
seems to have had some genuine value for him [9]and as he was able to tell where he
had seen it more than thirty years before. Talking repeatedly of "van Gogh's picture"
rather suggests that despite his position about the artist's unimportance he might have
had some fondness for the Dutch painter. A context for the name dropping is created
as Dürer, a known favorite in Hitler's taste, is mentioned at the end of the text, just as
the beginning the name of his musical idol has been sneaked in. The point of
identifying exactly which picture Heidegger had in mind, and Shapiro builds his case on
this, is somewhat blurred by the vague mention that "Van Gogh has painted such
shoes more than once", a knowledge perhaps not so common.
Even if Heidegger had viewed himself as something of a prophet for Hitler's Germany,
his attempt at rescuing van Gogh famously failed. The painter, with his notoriously
troubled personality, was readily labelled as a case of Entarte Kunst and his pictures
were removed from German art galleries. They were not destroyed but offered for sale
and Göring, as a private person, apparently bought one for himself.
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Thompson proposed here a rather bizarre explanation. Noting that van Gogh is also
mentioned in the Introduction to Metaphysics he quotes the experience suggested by
Heidegger in this text: "as if on a late autumn evening, when the last potato fires have
burned out, you yourself were heading wearily home from the field with your hoe" (IM
37-8/GA40 38) and asserts that the figure of a peasant woman, wearing a bonnet and
carrying a hoe, is seen subliminally in the right shoe. According to him this was actually
seen by Heidegger and his writings attest of the deep impression it left. All of this
seems to be proposed in earnest by Thompson, who provides a detail from the painting
(p.114/Fig.5), returns to his discovery at the end of the chapter (p.120/n.74) and
repeats it in the conclusion of his book (p.217).
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